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Abstract 
The nineteenth century pioneers in formulating economic problems mathematically often felt that they 
needed to explain their reasons for using mathematics. We will look at the arguments of Cournot, Thünen, 
Gossen, Jevons, Walras, Edgeworth, Marshall, Fisher, Wicksell, and Pareto. Three main arguments can 
be found: First, mathematics provides greater clarity of presentation, secondly, economics is 
fundamentally similar to the mathematical natural sciences, especially physics, and third, mathematics can 
help economists themselves to control the reasoning in their analysis. 
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The pioneers in formulating economic problems mathematically worked at a 
time when few understood this departure from the traditional verbal presentation which, 
at the very most, could contain statistics. Therefore they often felt that they needed to 
explain their reasons for using mathematics. 
 The discussion here will be restricted to early economists who fulfill three 
requirements: First, they made theoretical contributions which make their work (or at 
least their names) known to present-day economists with elementary knowledge of the 
history of economic thought. Second, mathematics in the form of algebra, functions, or 
derivatives played an essential part in their analyses. Third, they gave thorough 
arguments for their use of mathematics. We shall focus on those arguments. 
These requirements restrict the number of names but do not exclude a certain 
amount of arbitrariness. We will look closer at Cournot, Thünen, Gossen, Jevons, 
Walras, Edgeworth, Marshall, Fisher, Wicksell, and Pareto. Table 1 (below) 
shows these ten economists’ use of three chief arguments:  
• that using mathematics provides greater clarity of presentation including 
greater ease of checking the logic of the reasoning; 
• that using mathematics is appropriate since economics is like the 
mathematical natural sciences – especially physics and its subdivisions 
mechanics and astronomy; and  
• that using mathematics can help economists themselves to survey and control 
the reasoning in their analysis, even if the published result may end up being 
entirely verbal. 
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On this last point, Gunnar Myrdal (1972, pp. 144-145) recounts that when he 
worked on an appendix to his Asian Drama, he “actually came up with an illustration in 
the form of a set of algebraic equations and a huge diagram” which he nevertheless 
abstained from using in the text as “it would have been pretentious, and conducive to 
the mistaken view that it would have added anything to the knowledge [he] was trying 
to convey in the text”. Gustav Cassel, who himself had a doctor’s degree in 
mathematics before he became an economist, maintained in a letter to the Danish 
mathematician Annette Vedel in 1896 that “it’s mathematically trained thinking, not 
mathematics, that is needed to penetrate deeply into the economic questions” (Nycander 
2005, p. 17). 
 
Table 1: Pioneers’ arguments for mathematics in economics 
 Clarity Like physics Help the analysis 
Cournot  Yes  Yes  
Thünen  Yes  Yes  
Gossen  Yes  Yes  
Jevons   Yes  Yes  
Walras  Yes  Yes  
Edgeworth  Yes  Yes  
Marshall (Yes)      (Yes)  Yes 
Fisher  Yes      (Yes)  
Wicksell  Yes   Yes 
Pareto  Yes  Yes  
Note: Parenthesis means less emphasis on the argument. Blank space does not 
necessarily mean complete absence of the argument. 
 
 The clarity and physics arguments were used by almost all these economics 
pioneers, though Marshall emphasized especially that mathematics could help the 
economist’s analysis (a point which Wicksell also made). But let’s look in some detail 
at how each of these pioneers argued. 
 
Cournot 
Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), a professor of mathematics in Lyon, published 
also in economics and philosophy of science, but mathematics dominated his thinking. 
He states in Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth 
([1838] 1963, p. 4) that he had “put aside questions, to which the mathematical analysis 
cannot apply”. Thus he let the method determine his choice of analytical question, 
rather than the reverse. However, in the opinion of a modern scholar, “No contribution 
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during this period [before Jevons’ Theory of Political Economy] could approach in 
quality or in breadth of vision Cournot’s Recherches” (Theocharis 1993, p. 266). 
 As algebra or calculus were not common in economic texts in 1838, Cournot 
expected criticism: “This is a plan likely, I confess, to draw on me at the outset the 
condemnation of theorists of repute. With one accord they have set themselves against 
the use of mathematical forms, and it will doubtless be difficult to overcome today a 
prejudice which thinkers, like Smith and other modern writers, have contributed to 
strengthen.” (p. 1-2) 
 
But the critics had not understood what it was about, Cournot continues. They 
believe that “the use of symbols and formulas could only lead to numerical 
calculations”, and as “the subject was not suited to such a numerical determination of 
values by means of theory alone,” the mathematical apparatus was meaningless. “But 
those skilled in mathematical analysis know that its subject is not simply to calculate 
numbers, but that it is also employed to find relations between magnitudes which cannot 
be expressed in numbers.” If mathematical symbols “are able to facilitate the exposition 
of problems, to render them more concise, to open the way to more extended 
development, and to avoid the digression of vague argumentation” (p. 2), they should 
not be rejected just because they are not equally familiar to all readers. This is the 
clarity argument for mathematics. 
 Cournot also gave analogies from mathematical astronomy in his analysis of 
some phenomena in the economy. Concerning variations in the price of wheat, he says, 
“as in astronomy, it is necessary to recognize secular variations which are independent 
of periodic variations” (p. 20). And the concept “corrected money would be the 
equivalent of the mean sun of astronomers” (p. 21). Thus, Cournot also argues by 
analogy with physics. 
 
Thünen 
Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1783-1850) – who had studied natural sciences, 
economics, and mathematics in connection with his studies of agronomy – used an 
inheritance to buy the estate Tellow in Mecklenburg in 1809. His main work – only 
parts of which have been translated and published as Von Thünen’s Isolated State 
(1966) – is an example of applied economics, mathematics, and agronomy, using data 
and experience from Tellow. The book – whose first German edition appeared in 1826 
– came out in a substantially expanded second edition in 1850 and then in posthumous 
editions in 1863 and 1875. 
 Thünen (1966, p. 229) asserts that the results in the first edition (“Part One” in 
later editions) had been deduced “from a formula on the costs and yield of agriculture, 
which itself was based on empirical data”. Provided that these data was correct and the 
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conclusions were consistent, “this method introduces mathematical certainty into a field 
where mere reasoning would give rise to wholly contradictory opinions.” This again is 
the clarity argument. 
 Thünen first adopts a verbal marginal analysis while praising the differential 
calculus, which is its mathematical equivalent. “Our method of determining the 
maximum net product is thus in accordance with the method which in mathematics has 
been proved correct for determining the maximum value of a function....” (p. 232) 
 Like Cournot, Thünen understood that his mathematical approach would be 
criticized by narrow-minded colleagues: 
“I am very much afraid that I have tried the patience of many of my readers with 
the algebraic calculations, because I am not unaware how burdensome and inconvenient 
even many learned men find algebraic formulas. 
 But the use of mathematics must, nevertheless, be allowed where the truth 
cannot be found without it. 
 If one in other scientific fields had had such a disinclination to mathematical 
calculation as in agriculture and political economy, we would still be in complete 
ignorance of the laws of astronomy; and shipping, which now connects all parts of the 
world because of the extension of astronomy, would be limited to mere coastwise 
shipping” (Thünen 1875, 2nd part, 1st section, pp. 177-178) 
Here Thünen invokes the physics argument. 
 
Gossen 
Hermann Heinrich Gossen (1810-1858) – though he was good at mathematics – 
aimed at a career in public service. However, that did not go well, so, after a short 
interlude in an insurance company, he retired in 1850 to develop his economic ideas. 
The result – presented in an 1854 book translated as The Laws of Human Relations and 
the Rules of Human Action Derived Therefrom – attracted attention only after his death. 
Astronomy was clearly the model for his approach. 
“I believe I have accomplished for the explanation of the relation among humans 
what Copernicus was able to accomplish for the explanation of the relations of heavenly 
bodies. I believe that I have succeeded in discovering the force, and in its general form 
also the law of the effect of this force, that makes possible the coexistence of the human 
race and that governs inexorably the progress of mankind. And just as the discoveries of 
Copernicus have made it possible to determine the paths of the planets for any future 
time, I believe that my discoveries enable me to point out to man with unfailing 
certainty the path that he must follow in order to accomplish the purpose of his life.” (p. 
cxlvii) 
Mathematics was important when determining the paths of the planets, and 
Gossen found an analogy with the economy. But he expected objections. 
 5 
“As to the exposition, its mathematical foundation will undoubtedly irritate the 
majority of those who are inclined to concern themselves with economic problems, as it 
is unfortunately not yet customary to consider mathematical competence as a necessary 
part of man’s education. For the justification of this framework, it suffices to observe 
that economics concerns itself with the interplay of a variety of forces, and that it is 
impossible to determine the resultant effect of these forces without calculus. For this 
reason it is impossible to present the true system of economics without the aid of 
mathematics – a fact that has long been recognized in the case of pure astronomy, pure 
physics, mechanics, and so forth. That we have not yet succeeded in finding an 
appropriate mathematical framework may have contributed substantially to the 
confusion in which economics finds itself today.” (p. cxlviii) 
Thus Gossen considered mathematics necessary for economics. But “taking into 
consideration ... that mathematics is by no means part of general training, [I have] 
striven constantly to proceed on the assumption that the reader knows only parts of 
mathematics that are taught in our Gymnasiums.” (p. cxlviii) 
 At the end of the book, Gossen interprets the laws which natural scientists have 
revealed – and his own economic laws – as a sign of God’s wisdom: 
“Given the mode in which the other laws of nature function, the Creator knew 
how, through the law of decrease in pleasure, to cause man – the creature to whom He 
granted the greatest self-determination – to use this freedom only in the most desirable 
way for the benefit for the whole universe.” (p. 299) 
 To Gossen, mathematics was thus a tool both for deducing and for expressing 
scientific laws given by God. 
 
Jevons 
William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) – like Cournot and Thünen – had a 
background in the natural sciences, having studied chemistry and botany as well as 
mathematics at the University College School in London before moving to Australia in 
1854 to work as an assayer at the Mint in Sydney. Here he also became interested in 
economics, finding the mathematical approach natural. To him, the essence of economic 
questions was mathematical. In 1858 he wrote to a sister who was also reading 
economics: 
 “You will perceive that economy, scientifically speaking, is a very contracted 
science; it is in fact a sort of vague mathematics which calculates the causes and effects 
of man’s industry.” (quoted by Black 1970, p. 12) 
Returning to England and picking up his studies again in 1859, Jevons became 
so convinced that his understanding of the mathematical nature of economics was 
correct that, according to a letter to his brother in 1860, he “cannot now read other 
books on the subject without indignation” (quoted by Black 1970, p. 13). But he 
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struggled with a problem which, today, would probably had been formulated in 
econometric terms, i.e., the relationship between theoretical principles and data: 
“While the theory is entirely mathematical in principle, I show, at the same time, 
how the data of calculation are so complicated as to be for the present hopeless. 
Nevertheless, I obtain from the mathematical principles all the chief laws at which 
political economists have previously arrived, only arranged in a series of definitions, 
axioms, and theories almost as rigorous and connected as if they were so many 
geometrical problems.” (quoted by Black 1970, p. 13) 
In a section in the introductory chapter of his The Theory of Political Economy 
(1871) – under the heading Mathematical Character of the Science – Jevons again 
maintains that economics is intrinsically mathematical: 
“It seems perfectly clear that Economy, if it is to be a science at all, must be a 
mathematical science. There exists much prejudice against attempts to introduce the 
methods and language of mathematics into any branch of the moral sciences. Most 
persons appear to hold that the physical sciences form the proper sphere of 
mathematical method, and that the moral sciences demand some other method, I know 
not what. My theory of Economy, however, is purely mathematical in character. Nay, 
finding that the quantities with which we have to deal are subject to continuous 
variation, I do not hesitate to use the appropriate branch of mathematical science, 
involving though it does the fearless consideration of infinitely small quantities. The 
theory consists in applying the differential calculus to the familiar notions of wealth, 
utility, value, demand, supply, capital, interest, labor, and all the other notions 
belonging to the daily operations of industry. As the complete theory of almost every 
other science involves the use of that calculus, so we cannot have a true theory of 
Political Economy without its aid. 
 To me it seems that our science must be mathematical, simply because it deals 
with quantities.” (pp. 3-4) 
Jevons gives the example of the “ordinary laws of supply and demand” which 
“express the mode in which the quantities vary in connection with the price. By this fact 
the laws are mathematical: Economists cannot deprive them of their nature by denying 
them the name; they might as well try to alter red light by calling it blue.” (pp. 4-5)  
Jevons believed that the reason why many were skeptical of using mathematics 
in economics was that they took ‘mathematical science’ to mean ‘exact science’. “They 
think that we must not pretend to calculate unless we have the precise data.” (p. 6) But, 
besides pure logic, there is no exact science, only more-or-less approximate sciences. 
Even astronomy is not a fully exact science, because every calculated solution of an 
astronomic problem “involves hypotheses which are not really true: as, for instance, that 
the earth is a smooth, homogeneous spheroid” (p. 7). 
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 Consequently, there is no fundamental difference between economics and 
astronomy, although astronomy is more exact than is economics. “There can be but two 
classes of science – those which are simply logical, and those which, besides being 
logical, are also mathematical.” (p. 8) In both astronomy and economics, “quantitative 
notions enter, and the science must be mathematical in nature, by whatever name we 
call it.” (p. 8) 
 In his introduction to the second (1879) edition, Jevons comments on a 
discussion whether economics should be a logical science, à la Ricardo, or an inductive 
science. He maintains that we must accept, and keep apart, different methods for 
different types of knowledge. He himself works with general principles: “As all the 
physical sciences have their basis more or less obviously in the general principles of 
mechanics, so all branches and divisions of economic science must be pervaded by 
certain general principles.” His book is devoted “to the investigation of such principles 
– to the tracing out of the mechanics of self-interest and utility” (Jevons 1970, pp. 49-
50). 
 
Walras 
Léon Walras (1834-1910) has been described as “the most ardent [advocate of 
“a suitably mathematical economics”] as he saw his relentless and seemingly unyielding 
advocacy … met with disdain in France” (Turk 2012, p. 150), but this does not mean 
that he was a brilliant mathematician. As a young man, Walras had twice failed to be 
admitted to the distinguished École polytechnique, and he never got a university 
position in France, his home country. In 1870, though, he was offered a professorship in 
Lausanne in Switzerland, which he held until 1892. 
 The first part of Walras’ best known book, Elements of Pure Economics, was 
published in French in 1874, and the second part in 1877. He never left this work, but 
revised it thoroughly a few times before the fourth (1900) edition, which he denoted as 
“l’édition définitive”. 
 Walras was influenced by his father Auguste Walras, who had sought an analogy 
between the concept of scarcity (rareté) in economics and that of velocity in physics. In 
1860 the younger Walras tried to introduce a Newtonian model of market relations such 
that the “price of things is in inverse ratio to the quantity offered and in direct ratio to 
the quantity demanded” (quoted by Mirowski [1989] 1999, p. 255), which Mirowski 
regards as an incompetent attempt to link up with Newton’s force law. In 1862 Walras 
pleads in a letter for financial support to develop “an original creation,” a “new science 
... a science of economic forces analogous to the science of astronomical forces ... the 
analogy is complete and striking” (quoted by Mirowski [1989] 1999, p. 255). 
 Walras corresponded extensively with the leading French economists of the time 
– Henri Poincaré, Émile Picard, Émile Borel, etc. – seeking their support for his 
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mathematical economics. But they had reservations and proposals for modifications 
(which Walras did not follow) about the role of uncertainty; complications with 
discontinuities; the possibility of using qualitative measures which might require other 
mathematical approaches; and the role of memory and history in economic systems 
(Turk 2012, p. 151). 
 “This whole theory is mathematical,” Walras states in the preface of the fourth 
(1900) edition of Elements. Even if it could be described in words, the proof of the 
theory must be mathematical (Walras 2003, p. 43). 
 
Edgeworth 
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845-1926) – who was born in Ireland and educated 
initially at home – was admitted in 1862 to Dublin’s Trinity College, where he 
specialized in classical languages and literature. In the 1870s he published on ethics, 
psychology, and utilitarianism, including calculation of utility. In 1888 he became 
professor of political economy at King’s College in London, moving on to Oxford three 
years later. 
 As the title suggests, Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics (1881) contains 
mathematical expressions of psychic phenomena, though quantitatively, ordinary text 
dominates. He declares in the introduction: 
“An analogy is suggested between the Principles of Greatest Happiness, 
Utilitarian or Egoistic, which constitute the first principles of Ethics and Economics, 
and those Principles of Maximum Energy which are among the highest generalizations 
of Physics, and in virtue of which mathematical reasoning is applicable to physical 
phenomena as complex as human life.” (p. v) 
Edgeworth not only draws a parallel with physics but also adduces the clarity 
argument: 
“He that will not verify his conclusions as far as possible by mathematics ... will 
hardly realize the full value of what he holds, will want a measure of what it will be 
worth in however slightly altered circumstances, a means of conveying and making it 
current.” (p. 3) 
Marshall (1881, p. 457) published a friendly book review of Mathematical 
Psychics, but Marshall’s more reserved attitude towards mathematics is obvious. He 
thinks it will be interesting to watch the development of Edgeworth’s theory “and, in 
particular, to see how far he succeeds in preventing his mathematics from running away 
with him, and carrying him out of sight of the actual facts of economics”. 
 
Marshall 
Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) – the son of a Bank of England official – early 
showed an aptitude for mathematics, in which he became absorbed. But from the 
 9 
middle of the 1860s he was increasingly interested in philosophy, psychology, and 
economics. His main work – Principles of Economics 1890) – contains elements of 
mathematics, but placed mainly in an appendix. Marshall had thought carefully about 
what role mathematics should play in economic analysis. In a 1906 letter to Arthur 
Bowley he wrote: 
“But I had a growing feeling in the later years of my work at the subject that a 
good mathematical theorem dealing with economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be 
good economics: and I went more and more on the rules: 1) Use mathematics as a 
shorthand language, rather than as an engine of inquiry. 2) Keep to them till you have 
done. 3) Translate into English. 4) Then illustrate by examples that are important to real 
life. 5) Burn the mathematics. 6) If you can’t succeed in 4, burn 3. This last I did often. 
... I think you should do all you can to prevent people from using Mathematics in cases 
in which the English Language is as short as the Mathematical.” (quoted by 
Groenewegen 1995, p. 413) 
This restrictive attitude to mathematics is also found in the preface of the various 
editions of Principles of Economics. In the first edition (1890) Marshall takes it for 
granted that the “notion of continuity with regard to development is common to all 
modern schools of economic thought, whether the chief influences acting on the them 
are those of biology ... or of history and philosophy.” (Marshall 1961, p. ix) He says that 
his own view has been influenced from both those directions, “but their form has been 
most affected by mathematical conceptions of continuity, as represented in Cournot’s 
Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses.” (p. ix) 
 Our observations of both the moral and physical worlds, he says, relate not so 
much to aggregate magnitudes as to marginal increments. Particularly, “the demand for 
a thing is a continuous function, of which the ‘marginal’ increment is, in stable 
equilibrium, balanced against the corresponding increment of its cost of production.” (p. 
x) This can be demonstrated with diagrams or mathematical symbols, i.e. derivatives, 
but diagrams are often more clear. Therefore, Marshall sometimes used diagrams as 
supplementary illustrations in footnotes. 
 The conclusion of the preface of the first edition elucidates rules 1-6 above: 
“The chief use of pure mathematics in economic questions seems to be in 
helping a person to write down quickly, shortly and exactly, some of his thoughts for his 
own use: and to make sure that he has enough, and only enough, premises for his 
conclusions (i.e., that his equations are neither more nor less in number than his 
unknowns). But when a great many symbols have to be used, they become very 
laborious to any one but the writer himself. And though Cournot’s genius must give a 
new mental activity to everyone who passes through his hands, and mathematicians of 
caliber similar to his may use their favorite weapons in clearing a way for themselves to 
the centre of some of those difficult problems of economic theory, of which only the 
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outer fringe has yet been touched; yet it seems doubtful whether any one spends his time 
well in reading lengthy translations of economic doctrines into mathematics, that have 
not been made by himself.1 A few specimens of those applications of mathematical 
language which have proved most useful for my own purpose have, however, been 
added in an Appendix.” (Marshall 1961, pp. x-xi) 
In his description of method in the preface of the eighth (1920) edition, Marshall 
discloses that he had hesitated when working out economic models by analogy with 
mechanics and physics: 
“The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic 
dynamics. But biological conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics; a 
volume of Foundations must therefore give relatively large place to mechanical 
analogies; and frequent use is made of the term ‘equilibrium’ which suggests something 
of statical analogy.” (Marshall 1961, p. xiv) 
However, it is change that Marshall actually wanted to understand: 
“Fragmentary statical hypotheses are used as temporary auxiliaries to dynamical 
– or rather biological – conceptions; but the central idea of economics, even when its 
Foundations alone are under discussion, must be that of living force and movement.” (p. 
xv) 
Indirectly, Marshall comes to the role of mathematics. Having established that 
marginal analysis is essential, he concludes: 
“The new analysis is endeavouring gradually and tentatively to bring into 
economics, as far as the widely different nature of material will allow, those methods of 
the science of small increments (commonly called the differential calculus) to which 
man owes directly or indirectly the greater part of the control that he has obtained in 
recent times over physical nature.” (p. xvii) 
 The method was still in its infancy, yet Marshall observed remarkable agreement 
among those who were working with it, “especially among such of them as have served 
an apprenticeship in the simpler and more definite, and therefore more advanced, 
problems of physics” (p. xvii). 
 
Fisher 
Irving Fisher (1867-1947) – the son of a Congregational minister – was engaged 
in many things beyond economics and statistics: the peace movement, eugenics, alcohol 
prohibition, vegetarianism, calendar reform, map projection…. 
 The contents of his Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and 
Prices ([1892] 1925) was “in substance” the same as his 1891 PhD thesis at Yale. He 
                                                 
1 Marshall’s critic Paul A. Samuelson ([1947] 1965, p. 6) disapproves of the last statement and thinks it 
‘should be exactly reversed’. 
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starts by noting that most persons, including economists, are satisfied with vague 
notions. Experience may give a practical conception of the working of, say, mechanics, 
but it “gives no inkling of the complicated dependence on space, time, and mass. Only 
patient mathematical analysis can do that.” (p. V) The same applies, Fisher says, to the 
relations between value, utility, and quantity in economics. 
 The advantage of mathematics varies with the ability of the user and with the 
complexity of the problem. Advanced physics requires mathematics, and “similarly in 
economics, mathematical treatment is relatively useful as the relations become 
relatively complicated. The introduction of mathematical method marks a stage of 
growth – perhaps it is not too extravagant to say, the entrance of political economy on a 
scientific era.” (p. 109) 
 Specific insights have been gained by means of mathematics. Fisher says it “is 
perhaps fair to credit the idea of marginal utility to mathematical method” (p. 110). 
About this idea – whose origins he attributes to Dupuit, Gossen, Jevons, Menger, and 
Walras – he says “All except Menger presented this idea, and presumably attained it, by 
mathematical method. ... This one achievement is a sufficient vindication of the 
mathematical method.” (p. 110) 
 Within physics, he says the chief mission of mathematics had been to correct 
wrong conclusions. But, also within economics, mathematics “has corrected numerous 
errors and confusion of thought” (p. 111). This clarity argument dominates in Fisher. 
 
Wicksell 
Knut Wicksell (1851-1926) – like Fisher – had broad intellectual interests, 
reflected both in his university studies and in his writings and speeches. Wicksell’s 
Bachelor studies included such disparate subjects as theoretical philosophy, history, 
Latin, Scandinavian languages, astronomy, and mathematics. His Licentiate studies of 
mechanics, physics, and mathematics even included a dissertation On Proving the 
Existence of a Root in an Algebraic Equation (Gårdlund 1996, p. 79). 
 Wicksell also pursued fine literature: Among his juvenile publications are both a 
collection of poems and a stage play which was performed some ten times at various 
locations. But to the general public he was known as an iconoclast and provocateur who 
loved to challenge traditional moral, religious, and political ideas. 
 So – despite Wicksell’s Licentiate studies of mathematical sciences – his 
conception of the world was influenced from many directions, which influenced the role 
he would give mathematics in political economy. 
 The first time Wicksell touched on the role of mathematics in economics was in 
his article “Kapitalzins und Arbeitslohn” (Interest on Capital and Wages, 1892), where 
he tried to give Böhm-Bawerk’s capital theory a mathematical guise. Among other 
things, Wicksell points out that the theory is about the length of the period of 
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production, making  it difficult to avoid differential calculus. But he expects to meet 
opposition, and thus begins by defending his approach with the clarity argument. 
“It is ... difficult to see why the use of mathematical symbols in economics 
should be prohibited forever, even when, without doubt, it could conduce to an 
abridgement of expression and to greater clarity of understanding.” (p. 858) 
 
Only basic mathematics is involved, Wicksell points out, and, besides, 
mathematical method is more and more used in the closely related discipline of 
statistics. But it is important to be aware of the limitations of mathematics: “Of course, 
one must be careful not to expect more from this method than it can give. From the 
crucible of the calculation does not an atom more of truth come out than what has been 
put into it.” (p. 858) The results are completely dependent on the assumptions, i.e., “the 
results can only lay claim to an entirely conditional validity.” (p. 858) 
Wicksell comes back to the role of mathematics in economics in 1893 in Value, 
Capital and Rent, where he concludes: “Mathematical expression ought to facilitate the 
argument, clarify the results, and so guard against possible faults of reasoning, that is 
all.” (Wicksell [1893] 1970, p. 53) Both Marshall and Wicksell seem to be concerned 
about what Romer (2015) recently called the difference between mathematical theory 
and mathiness. Like Marshall, Wicksell emphasizes that mathematics has no intrinsic 
value, and must not be placed over economic content: “It is, by the way, evident that the 
economic aspects must be the determining ones everywhere: Economic truth must never 
be sacrificed to the desire for mathematical elegance.” (p. 53) 
 In the second Swedish edition (1911) of Lectures on Political Economy, 
Wicksell again comments on mathematics as a protection – though not absolute 
protection – against syllogistic errors. But the mathematical method “has a great 
advantage over the merely descriptive method, in that errors committed cannot long be 
concealed, and false opinions cannot be defended long after they have been shown to be 
wrong.” (Wicksell 1977, p. xxiii). This is perhaps on overly optimistic judgment. 
 
Pareto 
Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) – born in Paris but brought up in Italy, where his 
parents moved in 1852 – began studying mathematical sciences at the University of 
Turin at age 16, and started a career as an engineer in 1870, first for a railway company. 
His writings broadened over the years, often arguing for economic liberalism. In 1892 
he accepted an invitation to succeed Walras at Lausanne, a position which he held until 
1911. During the last decades of his life he also wrote on matters which made his name 
as a sociologist. 
 In the first sentence of Pareto’s preface to his Cours d’économie politique 
(1896), he says that his object is to “give an outline of economic science considered as a 
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natural science” (p. iii), which hints at the physics argument. Concerning mathematics, 
he also says that he did not find it useful to “refuse the help of this powerful logic” (p. 
iii). 
 In the opening paragraph of the main text, Pareto repeats that he is going to 
explicate a natural science, “like psychology, physiology, chemistry, etc.”. This means 
that the study will not give instructions but will instead solve questions of the type: 
“Given certain premises, what will the consequences be?” (p. 2) 
 
Conclusion: Mathematical economy established 
The economists whom we have scrutinized used quite elementary mathematics. 
The development of mathematics itself was at quite another level at the time, and 
advanced mathematics meant anything for economics only later in the 20th century.2 
 Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 20th Century the role of mathematics in 
economic explication and analysis had been discussed so many times that most authors 
no longer felt a need to explain it, and if they did, they only reiterated what others had 
already said. 
 But that the use of mathematics in economics no longer required explanation or 
defense did not mean that mathematical presentations had totally displaced verbal texts. 
It took a long time before most economists mastered even the mathematics of the 
pioneers. When Wicksell reviewed Pareto’s Manuel d’économique politique in 1913, he 
declared that, to the majority of readers, the mathematical appendix “will ... be a closed 
book ... though from several points of view it is the most important and interesting” part 
of the work (Wicksell [1913] 1969, p. 160). Landreth and Colander (2002, p. 391) 
maintain that the mathematical approach was not well received in the United States 
until the middle of the 20th Century, and that these pioneers were, therefore, “unheeded 
prophets of the future”. 
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